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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the key factors to bring success to machine learning (ML) based systems in the 
operational environments is trying to understand the domain-specific data better. A 
considerable portion of the literature in ML applied to intrusion detection uses outdated 
data sets based on a simulated network with a limited environment. The characteristics of 
the real network traffic captured in a large environment include inherent diversity in the 
protocol behavior and the "crud" [1]. Moreover, the difficulties in capture process should 
not be underestimated. Flaws usually appear in datasets and the way we handle them may 
impact on measurements. Finally, the detection capacity of intrusion detection is highly 
influenced by the system configuration.  
We focus on a topic rarely investigated: the characterization of anomalies in a large 
network environment. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are used to detect exploits or 
other attacks that raise alarms. Some IDSs are able to detect another category of events 
that indicate that something is wrong but it may not be an attack. These anomalous events 
usually receive less attention than attack alarms, causing them to be frequently 
overlooked by security administrators. However, the observation of this activity 
contributes to understand the traffic network characteristics. On one hand, abnormal 
behaviors may be legitimate, e.g., misinterpreted protocols or malfunctioning network 
equipment, but on the other hand an attacker may intentionally craft packets to introduce 
anomalies to evade monitoring systems.  
With the trend in stealthy attacks and the prevalent threat of botnets, anomalous events 
observed in traffic should be considered more seriously than ever. Then we need a 
framework of reference to understand anomalous behavior, questions that arise are how 
frequent these events are and what is causing them.   
Recently, researchers have been enthusiastic about applying methods to automatic or 
semi-automatic learning in security logs. However, there is low acceptance of these 
techniques in the operational real-world network environment [2]. Considering that we 
want to achieve more efficient use of ML in the future, at this stage, we give a priority to 
 gaining knowledge from the traffic behavior observed at the main campus gateway. This 
thesis analyzes problems that arise in data pre-processing and are not anywhere 
documented. We assess the quality of the captured data, achieve a better comprehension 
of the major traffic characteristics and find possible explanations for anomalies observed 
in the captured network traffic. 
Anomalies found in operational network environments may indicate cases of evasion 
attacks, application bugs, and a wide variety of factors that highly influence intrusion 
detection performance. Then, we conduct a study to explore the nature of anomalies 
found in U-Tokyo Network using cooperatively Bro and Snort IDS among other 
resources. We analyze 6.5 TB of compressed binary tcpdump data representing 12 hours 
of network traffic.  
Our major contributions can be summarized in: 1) reporting the anomalies observed in 
real, up-to-date traffic from a large academic network environment, and documenting 
problems in research that may lead to wrong results due to misinterpretations of data or 
misconfigurations in software; 2) assessing the quality of data by analyzing the potential 
and the real problems in the capture process.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1     Background 
 
Computer networks are exposed to different types of threats that could affect the integrity 
of the data transmitted, confidentiality of the information and/or the availability of 
network services. Network analysis and intrusion detection are countermeasures to thwart 
botnets, viruses, spam, worms and any other types of malicious attacks on the network. 
To illustrate, the number of intrusion attempts per day in 2003 was in the order of 25 
billions [3]. Google’s researchers say that even a single visit to an infected web site 
enables the attacker to detect vulnerabilities of the user’s applications and force the 
download a multitude of malware binaries [4]. Metrics on web-based malware presented 
in the cited work reveal with high confidence that 10 percent of the 4.5 million analyzed 
URL are malicious. From an operational point of view, the increasing trend in the amount 
of security controls deployed in networks is indicating that everyday intruders baffle 
researchers with new insidious attacks. Even though old threats persist, techniques 
evolved: greed for notoriety, naïve viruses and overt attacks became less attractive. 
Economy factors and activism are motivating the interest in stealth and complex attacks.  
Botnets have recently become popular as the platform from which to launch other attacks, 
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) or spam. With covertly installed malware, 
an attacker (botmaster) can remotely control an infected machine (bot or zombie) using 
different communication channels, in a centralized (IRC and HTTP) or distributed 
architecture (P2P). According to Symantec a significant spike in new threats activity 
occurred during 2008. This company observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected 
computers per day in 2008, an increase of 31% from the previous period. A 90% of the 
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spam activity is generated in bot networks. Their population is dynamic over time making 
difficult to measure their size and estimate their prevalence. Bots can be inactive for 
several months or hours. Botmasters use techniques such as bot cloning or bot migration 
to avoid being tracked and make measurements difficult [5]. Vint Cerf, who is considered 
by the community as one of the “fathers” of Internet, told to the audience of the World 
Economic Forum 2007 that approximately 600 million computers are connected to the 
Internet, and that 150 million of them might be participants in a botnet.  
Research on pattern recognition and computational intelligence may be to the rescue 
against such menaces in the Internet. However, research on unconventional attacks 
recognition is scarce and so is integration of different methods.  
Anomalies are part of the Internet [6]. Anomalies detection is conducted using different 
approaches in response to the different goals that researchers try to achieve. Network 
security study has been developing methods for recognizing malignant patterns. On the 
other hand, network traffic study has been investigating methods for traffic classification 
mainly for traffic engineering. In a previous published paper [7], we observe that traffic 
classification techniques developed for traffic engineering could be combined into the 
current study of intrusion detection even further. A caveat is the volume of traffic logs 
that can be overwhelming in some high-speed networks. Some methods to filter out 
uninteresting data could alleviate the job of intrusion detectors. 
 
Machine Learning Applied to solve Information Security Problems 
 
Due to the necessity of analyzing huge amounts of data produced by one or more sensors 
deployed in large network environments, machine learning techniques rise in popularity 
among intrusion detection researchers. Such methods give the possibility of devising a 
hybrid system aiming to identify useful information for the two groups aforementioned. 
We observed two main trends: clustering sensor's alerts and detecting outliers in "normal" 
behavior profiles.  
A major goal in machine learning research is the automatically or semi-automatically 
recognition of complex patterns in data. Algorithms are trained with data samples to learn 
characteristics in order to make intelligent decisions using new data. In a nutshell, a 
machine learning project includes all or some of this phases: data preparation or pre-
processing, dimensionality reduction, training, evaluation and visualization. More 
information on these crucial steps is presented below.  
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 The quality of the sample is critical to achieve an unbiased representation of the 
domain and should be adequately pre-processed prior the training process.  
The landmark study on data preparation is the work of Lee and Stolfo [8], who 
established a framework for Mining Audit Data for Automated Models for Intrusion 
Detection (MADAM ID). Based on this framework, data mining algorithms were applied 
to the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation showing good results.  
DARPA data set [9, 10], which was collected and distributed by the MIT Lincoln 
Department, was the first standard corpora for evaluation of computer network intrusion 
detection systems. Data was collected in a simulated military network environment and 
includes a wide variety of intrusion attacks.  
Stolfo prepared KDD Cup 1999 data set [11], which was built based on DARPA’98. 
Training set contains 4,900,000 connection vectors, each of which contains 41 features 
and a label indicating if it represents normal traffic or an attack. Simulated attacks fall in 
four different categories: Denial of Service Attack (DoS), Use to Root Attack (U2R), 
Remote to Local Attack (R2L) and Probing Attack. KDD features are also classified in 
four groups: basic features (9) that are derived from packet headers, content features (13) 
that are derived payload of TCP packets, time based features (9) to inspect the packets 
within a temporal window of 2 seconds and host based features (10) to inspect the 
packets within a window of one hundred connections.  
Some alternatives to the DARPA and KDD benchmarks are the Genome Data, attacks 
obtained through honeypots and sandbox, data simulation, attack injection in normal 
traffic, and dump real network data placing confidence in the knowledge of network and 
security experts to classify attacks. Each of the presented solutions has limitations.  
 The selection of the algorithm should be carefully considered to achieve project 
success.  
Machine learning is a scientific interdisciplinary field. Proposed ideas may come from 
several areas such as probability theory, statistics, pattern recognition, cognitive science, 
data mining, adaptive control, computational neuroscience and theoretical computer 
science. Three main approaches are supervised learning, unsupervised learning and 
reinforcement learning.  
Finding the appropriate algorithm for the domain of study is not simple and researchers 
have to consider the trade-off between two or more variables, such as algorithm 
performance in terms of correct classifications, computer resources consumption, ability 
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to treat nominal features and ability to learn in unbalanced samples among other 
algorithms specifics. 
Self-organizing maps in addition to other types of neural networks, support vector 
machines, decision tree and K-means are some examples of algorithms that require 
attribute vectors for training and testing. Each input instance is characterized by the value 
of attributes or features that measure different aspects of the instance [12]. The use of 
public available datasets that contains classified and labeled instances of attacks can 
reduce time. 
 Weak validations may undermine the efforts made along long-term research projects. 
The methodology used for validation depends on the approach of machine learning 
research. Classification methods may be served by pre-labeled data while clustering 
methods may use cross-validation. The simplest way to evaluate the performance of the 
algorithm is by counting the proportion of correctly predicted samples. For this purpose, 
one approach is to subdivide the dataset in training and test samples that are mutually 
independent [13]. Results obtained in the evaluation using previously unseen samples 
may be use as a feedback to improve the training phase.  
 
1.2     Motivation and Challenges 
 
We trust on the ability of machine learning algorithms to leverage the power detection of 
standard IDS deployed in operational network environments. However, to solve real and 
interesting problems, such ability is highly influenced by external factors. First, if the 
quality of data were low, input samples would fail in representing the domain. Thus, the 
algorithm would not be able to recognize interesting patterns of data, or the presence of 
recognized patterns might not indicate that the system was a contribution to solving real 
world problems. Second, decisions made by the system designer must not be neglected. 
Researchers must decide the representation of raw data, select the most appropriate 
algorithm for data characterization, specify how this algorithm is parameterized, validate 
results and finally give a good interpretation of the output. Some approaches try to 
minimize the human-machine interaction but systems still rely on human intuition.  
Moreover, data preparation usually consumes the bulk of effort invested in a learning 
process [12]. As a rule of thumb, it is recognized that up to 80 percent of the time spent 
on a machine learning project is gone during the pre-processing phase.  
5 
People involved in the DARPA and KDD evaluation had substantially contributed to the 
field of intrusion detection. However, flaws in the mentioned data sets caused by 
simulation artifacts gave reasons to criticize the project from the beginning. In 2000, the 
DARPA dataset received a comprehensive criticism of the failure to demonstrate the 
accuracy of the model [14]. Other research confirms the afore-mentioned criticism by 
conducting some experiments they showed that simulation errors could lead to 
inaccuracies in network traffic affecting anomaly detection systems that model normal 
behavior [15]. Moreover, the KDD dataset is not adequate to train machine-learning 
algorithms for misuse detection. The limitations of the dataset, detailed in [16], cause a 
misuse detection system to fail in the identification of 50% of the KDD’s attack 
categories. 
While researchers acknowledge the KDD problems, the use of this benchmark dataset is 
the solution at hand to evade some of the challenging problems mentioned at the 
beginning of this section. Thus, it follows that in spite of the caveats, it is not rare to find 
machine learning projects that still use KDD for training and/or validation. We consider 
that neglecting KDD issues poses a big risk to the machine learning literature applied to 
the information security field since the study of some topics may be biased. For instance, 
considering the case of features selection, a question that arises is what features should 
we use for reliable detection of attacks. In trying to find answers, we observe that several 
studies [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] are based on KDD. Consequently, possible answers are 
limited to the list of 41 features, which in some cases is reduced to only 6 basic features. 
Each feature can be good as discriminating one class and bad for discriminating others. 
Kayacik and Heywood [19] demonstrated that three of the attack classes that make up 
98% of the training KDD set are highly related to certain features that make their 
classification easier. 
KDD is not the only problem. Indeed, there are several pitfalls affecting the way machine 
learning based research is conduct that result in a low acceptance of these techniques in 
an operative real-world network environment [2]. Zanero reviews issues on the evaluation 
of IDS systems and also mentions the difficulties in simulating background traffic [23]. 
Finally, Gates and Taylor [24] discuss challenges in the anomaly detection paradigm and 
closely examine assumptions commonly made in network anomaly detection.  
 
An assessment on true data 
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Large academic networks present a unique environment that involves a wide variety of 
applications, protocols, and network equipment as well as heterogeneous behavior of 
users, administrators and intruders. For this thesis research, a 6.5 TB tcpdump binary data 
captured at the main link of our campus were available to us. Link operates at maximum 
rate of 10Gbps. Packets contain full payload and traces include uplink and downlink. A 
caveat is that a priori information on network layout as well as protocols found on the 
network is extremely scarce.  
An initial approach was to extract new features that characterized U-Tokyo network 
traffic. To have a reference, we calculated the values for the 41 features [11] using our 
capture and the help of Bro IDS and a script developed for the project described in [25]. 
Our preliminary results showed that several values were zero. We also encounter 
limitations with Bro when calculating the traffic transfer in connections, particularly to 
measure the bytes transferred in anomalous traffic. The attempts to cluster Bro and Snort 
outputs using Self-organizing maps and K-means algorithms also failed. It was hard for 
us to apply machine learning methods efficiently. Without having references for our data, 
clustering methods did not help us at this preliminary stage to achieve a better 
comprehension of the major traffic characteristics and anomalies observed in the captured 
network traffic.  
We changed our approach motivated by the necessity to grasp the nature of anomalies 
presented in Internet and to understand the roots of problems that arise in pre-processing 
and are not anywhere documented. We observe a wrong methodology when data that do 
not represent the domain is used in machine learning research projects. Key factors to 
bring success to machine learning based systems in operational environments are the 
better comprehension of the domain-specific data and avoid the treatment of security 
alerts with a “black box” methodology as often seen [2]. Our thesis is that the most 
important part of pre-processing is auditing (1) real, (2) up-to-date and (3) large amount 
of data before selecting reliable features for IDS.  
Therefore, the outcome of this thesis serves as a baseline for future research based on 
machine learning methods or other techniques. Our main contributions are: 1) a summary 
of anomalies observed in a large academic network environment that includes behavior 
patterns that are not considered in KDD dataset and 2) sharing our experiences dealing 
with an enormous amount of packets. Given the interdisciplinary character of this area, 
our efforts are made toward a better understanding of anomaly detection and a greater 
interaction between different groups. 
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1.3     Thesis Outline 
 
Below, there is a brief summary of the following chapters. 
 Chapter 2 
Introduces the tools and methodology to evaluate the data. 
 Chapter 3 
First, discusses problems related with the data captured process. Later, presents 
characteristics of network traffic using two approaches: connections status and 
amount of traffic exchange. The analysis of bogus connections ends this chapter.  
 Chapter 4 
Presents the most representative cases of anomalies observed in the network. The 
scope of the analysis covers pathologies found at different levels of the network stack 
illustrating a wide variety of cases ranging from fragmentation, bad packet 
checksums, TCP anomalies and application anomalies. 
 Chapter 5 
Concludes the thesis by summarizing our contributions and presenting interesting 
ideas for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
2.1     Stages of the Research Project 
 
With the purpose to understand the root causes of network anomalies, we conducted 
qualitative and quantitative observations on the network traffic characteristics. Moreover, 
to observe the problematic from different angles, the background necessary for 
conducting experiments covers several disciplines. Thus, we accomplished this research 
project in four stages. 
 Literature Study 
The main goal at this phase was to comprehend the context of the multiple 
disciplines involved in anomaly detection. We strived for obtaining solid 
knowledge on this topic. Our published work [7] summarizes the outcome of our 
survey. We extended the contents of that paper in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  We 
also learned practical issues about data pre-processing to train a neural artificial 
network while we worked on another published paper that concludes the previous 
research. 
 
 Data Verification 
This phase involved the quality assessment of the data provided. Two different 
problems were considered. One of them was documented in a report to the 
capture machine manufacturer and raised deep investigation on their side. More 
details are given on the next Chapter. 
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 Data Preparation 
The preparation of 6.5 TB of raw binary data packets for our analysis was done in 
several steps. To illustrate, a capture representing 10 minutes of network traffic 
(at early hours of the night) had a rate of 193,556 packets/sec with an average 
packet size of 1,066 bytes. When using Bro, this input generates approximately 
1.6 millions of connections with more than 88 thousands of anomalous events. 
Conversely, Snort raised 5.8 millions of alerts (the alerts include a large amount 
of anomalous events indicating fragmentation observed by Snort pre-processors). 
This numbers decreases oscillating as network load diminishes over the night. 
Later in this chapter, we give details on the setup configuration for both systems. 
Throughout the thesis, the other considerations are documented.   
 
 Data Analysis 
In this thesis, we fed Bro with data representing 500 minutes of traffic. We also 
verified some cases with Snort; data input involves 20% of the total traffic. The 
outputs were overwhelming. We developed ad-hoc scripts, load events in 
databases and generate plots to facilitate the data analysis. The next section 
explains why and how we did it. 
 
2.2     Data Analysis 
 
2.2.1     Overall Approach 
 
Security monitors, e.g. IDS, analyze traffic and record anomalous activity and raise 
alarms when an attack is recognized. Anomalous events are warning us that something 
may be wrong; they do not necessary indicate an attack. We believe that the study of 
anomalies is important. Proliferating botnets act surreptitiously. Behind botnets there is 
an underground economy that impulse the development of sophisticated mechanisms to 
abuse our networks without being discovered. These mechanisms might be detected by 
the verification of anomalous behavior. 
A caveat is that anomaly activity increases the uncertainty in the analysis. The number of 
anomalies events surpassed the number of alerts triggered by sensors; it is more difficult 
to understand the causes; and a considerable part may not indicate malicious activity. 
Usually, security administrators overlook anomalies. 
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Machine learning techniques could be a solution to solving some of the problems above 
mentioned. To make use of this approach, first we need to understand better the nature of 
anomalies and evaluate them in context with the environment. Traffic network analysis is 
a must. 
Considering our network environment, there is neither the previous statistics on the traffic 
network behavior at the main gateway, nor even the estimation of the basic network 
characteristics. As a result, we would like to have mere estimation on the number of hosts 
inside U-Tokyo network. Currently, there is no answer to our question. 
Consequently, prior to analyze anomalies, we examine the traffic behavior and attempt to 
profile the major characteristics. 
A limitation is that we are not able to contrast our statistics with the previous metrics. 
However, we believe that in this context our work may shed a brighter light on what we 
know about U-Tokyo network and bring attention to a topic that was not considered in 
the previous research. Combination of network measurement study and security study 
will open more opportunities for further research. 
 
2.2.2     Anomalies Observation Method 
 
Anomalies are detected using intrusion detection systems. Bro IDS is the main system 
and Snort IDS is the second monitor. We conduct analysis that covers a wide aspect of 
anomalous behavior in context with the environment where the anomalies are observed. 
To achieve this goal we analyze 35 millions (M) of incoming connections and 26 M of 
outgoing connections to observe patterns in basic features such as connections, traffic 
amount; in aggregate data to analyze frequent episodes to illustrate some Dos and 
Probing attacks by observing SYN and fragments among other indicators. Then, we 
scrutinize activity not considered in the KDD dataset using indicators such as more than 1 
M of anomalies, host identified as not following standard and evasion techniques that 
might be associated with botnets. Finally, we conclude with a global view of the 
anomalies found. 
The minimal checklist for assessment the anomaly includes: 
 Generate plots discriminating incoming and outgoing activity for each network 
 Detect interesting patterns 
 Check source hosts (e.g. distinct host, distinct subnet class C, top-ranked host) 
 Check destination hosts 
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 Check source port 
 Check destination port 
 Check connections flag status and services/protocols involved (anomaly in 
context) 
 Check other anomalies and alerts triggered by the top-ranked host (anomaly in 
context) 
 
2.3     Tools 
 
Security network research is focused, roughly speaking, on protecting resources from 
threats that originate either outside or inside of an organization. To pursue this goal, an 
intrusion detection model was proposed in 1987 [26] and many Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) were developed based on that model. The taxonomy defined in [27] 
provides a survey and classification of different IDS approaches to understand the 
principle of operation, underlying mechanisms, the targeted intrusion and environment 
that govern the detection strategy. A more recent wide-ranging survey of intrusion 
detection efforts is in [28]. For an extensive review of computational intelligence (CI) 
methods that includes artificial neural networks, fuzzy sets, evolutionary computation, 
artificial immune systems, swarm intelligence and soft computing, see [29]. 
Two major approaches govern the research on intrusion detection: misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. However, it is generally difficult to label a state-of-the-art solution 
using only one of these categories. On one side, misuse detection systems are typically 
based in signatures to recognize known attacks. They are widely accepted and deployed 
in industrial environments because its good performance in high-speed networks. The 
need for frequent maintenance to avoid becoming outdated against the evolving nature of 
threats is a major drawback. As an example, the number of new and updates rule in the 
VTR ruleset for Snort version 8.6.1 in the last 180 days was 214 and 1571 respectively. 
On the other side, anomaly detection systems use a profile for normal and legitimate 
traffic to establish a baseline and look for deviations from this normal profile. They may 
be helpful in recognizing unknown attacks. The two paradigms are complementary, and 
some solutions integrate both of them to reinforce countermeasures. 
                                                
1 Number was calculated using the change-log pages between 13-Ago-10 to 12-Jan-11. Source: from the 
Sourcefire website .We could not find updates in Nov and updates of 27-Sep-10 and 12-Oct-10, which 
contains the major numbers of changes, are obtained from a cached. 
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2.3.1     Bro IDS 
 
This section summarizes information obtained in [30]. Bro IDS is a network-based 
intrusion detection system that monitors passively the traffic seen on a network link. Its 
core is an event engine that pieces network packets into events that reflect different type 
of activity. Events are actions that take place on the network. Examples of events might 
be a failed connection attempt, a TCP packet with a bad checksum, a successful 
connection or an IRC invalid command. 
Philosophy 
It was originally designed by Vern Paxson of ICSI’ s Center for Internet Research (ICIR), 
Berkeley to provide an open-source research framework for online network analysis. 
Project started in 1995 at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBL) and Bro was 
first published in 1998. Its design’s concepts put emphasis on the application-level 
semantics and tracking information over time. Pre-written policy scripts are mostly 
neutral, i.e. no presumption of “good” or “bad”. An analyst can use a specialized Bro 
language to write domain-specific policy scripts.  
Arquitecture 
Illustrated in Figure 2.1 
Analysis model 
Analysis model is not signature-matching, though Bro provides support for byte-
stream/packet-based signature matching, including context. In the past, the python script 
snort2bro was used to translate Snort signatures to Bro language but today Snort newer 
options difficult an automatic translation. Analysis model is not anomaly detection, 
though Bro is usable for that in principle. 
Logs 
Currently, the event engine processes more than 300 events that are handled by analyzers. 
Bro provides analyzers to cover different aspects of the connection, i.e. generic 
connection analysis at the level of TCP or UDP and specific analysis for an application 
on top of TCP. 
Usually, detection is expressed in terms of “notice” and eventually is promoted to 
“alarm”. 
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Each analyzer logs its output in ASCII files. The main files are:  
 conn.log  
One line represents a summary of each connection seen by Bro, the format is shown 
below:  
 
An example of a connection summary: 
 
931803523.006848 54.3776 http 7320 38891 206.132.179.35 
128.32.162.134 RSTO X %103 
 
Figure 2.1 – Bro Arquitecture [30] 
 
<start> <duration> <local IP> <remote IP> <service> <local port> \ 
<remote port> <protocol> <org bytes sent> <res bytes sent> <state> \ 
<flags> <tag> 
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The connection began at Unix time 931803523.006848 (18:18:43 hours GMT on July 12, 
1999) and lasted 54.3776 seconds. The service was HTTP (presumably). The originator 
sent 7,320 bytes, and the responder sent 38,891 bytes. Because the L flag is absent, the 
connection was initiated by host 128.32.162.134, and the responding host was 
206.132.179.35. When the summary was written, the connection was in the RSTO state.  
There is additional information, summarized by the string %103 logged in the http log.  
 
 weird.log 
Weird analyzer processes unusual or exceptional events. Such events can reflect incorrect 
assumptions, attempts by attackers to confuse the monitor and evade detection, broken 
hardware, misconfigured networks, and so on. We use this file as a source of anomalies. 
For each event, it is possible to configure the action taken by the analyzer. An event 
could be ignored, recorded each time it occurs, recorded the first time it occurs for a 
given connection or the first time it occurs for a given originating host.  
 notice.log 
It is the primary output facility. Distributed scripts detect 78 different types of notices. 
Notices do not necessarily convey a problem but scripts provide number of ways to 
decide when to promote a notice to an “alarm”. 
 alarm.log 
Alarms can be triggered when network traffic matches signatures and when matches rules 
embedded in analyzers. Notices and weird events can be promoted to alarms. 
Dynamic Detection Protocol (DDP) 
When the DDP framework is loaded, every connection is associated with an analyzer tree 
that contains an arbitrary number of analyzers that can be modified during the lifetime of 
the connection. Old versions of Bro used the port number to launch an analyzer but, with 
the new capability, Bro can use the payload to make a decision about the correct analyzer 
independently of the port number. Analyzers are turned off dynamically when they are 
detected as wrong analyzer [31]. 
Selection Criteria 
The aforementioned characteristics make Bro a unique platform, well aligned for 
behavioral analysis, policy enforcement and specification-based intrusion detection. 
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We use Bro as the main system to characterize and analyze anomalies.  
 
2.3.2     Snort IDS 
 
This section summarizes information obtained in the Snort User Manual and README 
files included in Snort code, which can be found in [32]. Snort is a network-based 
intrusion detection system that can be used as a straight packet sniffer like tcpdump, a 
packet logger or as a network intrusion prevention system. Its core is the detection engine 
and the rules database. 
Snort performs protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and is commonly used to 
actively block or passively detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer 
overflows, stealth port scans, web application attacks, SMB probes, and OS 
fingerprinting attempts, amongst other features. 
Philosophy 
Released originally by Martin Roesch in 1998, developed and maintain by Sourcefire (a 
company founded by the same author). The Snort project relies on open source 
development methodology. People in the open source Snort community worldwide can 
detect and respond to bugs and other security threats.  
Sourcefire offers a commercial version of the Snort technology that includes an easy-to-
use interface, optimized hardware, powerful data analysis and reporting, policy 
management and administration, a full suite of product services, and 24x7 support.  
Subscribers receive new and updates to rules in real time, registered users have access to 
the same rules 30 days after release.  
Arquitecture 
First, traffic is acquired from the network link via libpcap. Packets are passed through a 
series of decoder routines that first fill out the packet structure for link level protocols 
then are further decoded for things like TCP and UDP ports. 
Packets are then sent through the registered set of preprocessors. Each preprocessor 
checks to see if this packet is something it should look at. 
Packets are then sent through the detection engine. The detection engine checks each 
packet against the various options listed in the Snort rules files. Each of the keyword 
options is a plugin; then, is easily extensible. 
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Analysis Model 
Analysis model is mainly based on rules, which are more powerful than signatures. 
According to the definition given by Sourcefire a signature-matching approach is used for 
matching a particular exploit or unique pattern, conversely a rule checks vulnerabilities. It 
is necessary to understand the nature of the vulnerability to develop the rule.  
Classification of the rule set: 
 Not suspicious traffic 
 Unknown traffic 
 Potencially bad traffic 
 Attempted Information Link 
 Attempted Denial of Service 
 Attempted User Privilege Gain 
 Unsuccessful User Privilege Gain 
 Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain 
 Successful Administrator Privilege Gain 
 
Preprocessors 
Preprocessors are a key part of the Snort arquitecture. They are called before the 
detection engine. There are many preprocessors and users can extend them. We introduce 
the two preprocessors related to our analysis. Both are target-based, i.e. the system tries 
to recreate the behavior of the target system. We will talk more about this capability in 
the Section 4.2.1.  
Frag3: IP defragmentation module. It can alerts 13 anomalies: 
1     IP Options on fragmented packet 
2     Teardrop attack 
3     Short fragment, possible DoS attempt 
4     Fragment packet ends after defragmented packet 
5     Zero-byte fragment 
6     Bad fragment size, packet size is negative 
7     Bad fragment size, packet size is greater than 65536 
8     Fragmentation overlap 
9     IPv6 BSD mbufs remote kernel buffer overflow 
10    Bogus fragmentation packet. Possible BSD attack 
11    TTL value less than configured minimum, not using for reassembly 
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12    Number of overlapping fragments exceed configured limit 
13    Fragments smaller than configured min_fragment_length 
Stream5 is a TCP reassembly module with ability to track TCP and UDP sessions. TCP 
sessions are identified using the 3-way handshake.  UDP sessions are established using 
consecutive series of UDP packets from two end points via the same set of ports. It also 
tracks ICMP for checking messages that will end TCP and UDP connections 
(unreachable and service unavailable messages). It can alerts 10 TCP anomalies: 
1 SYN on established session  
2 Data on SYN packet  
3 Data sent on stream not accepting data  
4 TCP Timestamp is outside of PAWS window  
5 Bad segment, overlap adjusted size less than/equal 0  
6 Window size (after scaling) larger than policy allows  
7 Limit on number of overlapping TCP packets reached  
8 Data after Reset packet  
9 Possible Hijacked Client  
10 Possible Hijacked Server  
Logs 
The way Snort logs events is user-configurable and allows several methods. We opted for 
logging events directly in a database. This is not the fastest and efficient option, but 
considering that our analysis was offline, our priority was the convenience of realizing 
SQL queries on the event tables. 
Selection Criteria 
According to Sourcefire website, Snort is the world’s most downloaded IDS with nearly 
4 millions of downloads to date and approximately 300.000 registered users. Because it 
can be download for free, the number of downloads does not indicate the number of Snort 
installations, however, it is a good indicator of its popularity. 
 
2.4     Other considerations 
 
2.4.1     Argus 
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When considering the adequate tool for helping with the traffic analysis, we evaluated 
Argus [33]. This software is a Network Audit Record Generation and Utilization System. 
It processes packets and generates detailed status reports of the flows detected in the 
packet stream. The user has a wide variety of options to aggregate traffic and define flows 
according the needs of the project. Several published works are based on Argus [34, 35, 
36]. 
We conducted basic experiences using Argus on part of the capture, but the output flows 
differed from Bro output. It was not easy to associate some anomalies events triggered by 
Bro with the flows recognize with Argus. Differences in the number of IP addresses 
detected by both systems made us desist of using Argus to reduce sources of 
uncertainties.  However, we consider our tests as preliminary work and this subject 
deserves more attention in future research.  
 
2.4.2     System Configuration 
 
Bro is applied to the totality of data and Snort to a 20% of data. 
Bro 
To execute Bro we run this command on 50 subsets of captured data, called “periods”: 
> bro $files site-policy –f tcpdump-filters variables list-of-analyzers 
$files:  
This variable contains a list of consecutive files that in total represents 10 minutes of 
network traffic (1 period) 
Site policy:  
We indicate the 3 main blocks of IP class B to be considered as our local networks.  
 @load site  
redef local_nets += { x1.x2.00/16, y1.y2.0.0/16, z1.z2.0.0/16 }; 
 
For compatibility with Snort, we specify:  
redef tcp_reassembler_ports_orig: set[port]+= 
{21/tcp,22/tcp,23/tcp,25/tcp,42/tcp,53/tcp,79/tcp,109/tcp,110/tcp,111/tcp,113/tcp,119
/tcp,135/tcp,136/tcp,137/tcp,139/tcp,143/tcp,161/tcp,445/tcp,513/tcp,514/tcp,587/tcp
,593/tcp,691/tcp,1433/tcp,1521/tcp,2100/tcp,3306/tcp,6665/tcp,6666/tcp,6667/tcp,66
68/tcp,6669/tcp,7000/tcp,32770/tcp,32771/tcp,32772/tcp,32773/tcp,32774/tcp,32775
/tcp,32776/tcp,32777/tcp,32778/tcp,32779/tcp,80/tcp,443/tcp,465/tcp,563/tcp,636/tc
p,989/tcp,992/tcp,993/tcp,994/tcp,995/tcp,1220/tcp,2301/tcp,3128/tcp,6907/tcp,7702
/tcp,7777/tcp,7779/tcp,7801/tcp,7900/tcp,7901/tcp,7902/tcp,7903/tcp,7904/tcp,7905/
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tcp,7906/tcp,7908/tcp,7909/tcp,7910/tcp,7911/tcp,7912/tcp,7913/tcp,7914/tcp,7915/t
cp,7916/tcp,7917/tcp,7918/tcp,7919/tcp,7920/tcp,8000/tcp,8008/tcp,8028/tcp,8080/tc
p,8180/tcp,8888/tcp,9999/tcp}; 
redef tcp_reassembler_ports_resp: set[port]+= 
{80/tcp,443/tcp,465/tcp,563/tcp,636/tcp,989/tcp,992/tcp,993/tcp,994/tcp,995/tcp,122
0/tcp,2301/tcp,3128/tcp,6907/tcp,7702/tcp,7777/tcp,7779/tcp,7801/tcp,7900/tcp,790
1/tcp,7902/tcp,7903/tcp,7904/tcp,7905/tcp,7906/tcp,7908/tcp,7909/tcp,7910/tcp,791
1/tcp,7912/tcp,7913/tcp,7914/tcp,7915/tcp,7916/tcp,7917/tcp,7918/tcp,7919/tcp,792
0/tcp,8000/tcp,8008/tcp,8028/tcp,8080/tcp,8180/tcp,8888/tcp,9999/tcp}; 
tcpdump filters:  
"tcp or udp or icmp or (ip[6:2] & 0x3fff != 0)" 
variables: 
dpd_conn_logs=T  
list-of-analyzers: 
dpd detect-protocols dyn-disable detect-protocols-http proxy ssh irc-bot brolite print-
globals capture-loss 
 
Snort 
All the system configuration is established in the snort.conf file: 
 
# Setup the network addresses you are protecting 
var HOME_NET [x1.x2.00/16, y1.y2.0.0/16, z1.z2.0.0/16] 
 
#Servers on your network 
$HOME_NET 
# Target-based IP defragmentation.   
preprocessor frag3_global: max_frags 1048576 , memcap 1073741824 
preprocessor frag3_engine: policy windows detect_anomalies overlap_limit 10 
min_fragment_length 100 timeout 180 
 
# Target-Based stateful inspection/stream reassembly. 
preprocessor stream5_global: max_tcp 1048576, max_udp 1048576, memcap 
1073741824, track_tcp yes, track_udp yes, track_icmp no 
preprocessor stream5_tcp: policy windows, detect_anomalies, max_queued_segs 
10485760, require_3whs 180, \ 
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2.4.3     Future Versions 
 
We use for the analysis Bro Version 1.5.1 and Snort Version 2.8.6.1 (using PCRE 
version: 8.10 2010-06-25 and ZLIB version: 1.2.3.3). Snort rule set corresponds to VTR 
rules of Jun 23th, 2010. 
Both systems are planning major changes. Bro mailing list communicated that Bro 
Project received a 3 year grant from the National Science Foundation for improving the 
project on all fronts including code quality and supportability, "out of the box" detections, 
improved user support, and new documentation. A new version of the software is planned 
to be release this year. Snort Version 3 was release more than 2 years ago, but it is still in 
beta. According to Snort designer “the new version 3 will serve as a network traffic 
analysis platform as well. The arquitecture is less susceptible to IDS/IPS evasion or 
bypass attacks, where attackers sneak past the devices.”  
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Chapter 3 
Traffic Characteristics 
 
3.1     Collected Data 
 
Full payload packets were collected at the main campus link of University of Tokyo 
(abbreviated Todai) during night hours from July 15th 2009 6:53 PM to July 16th 2009 
6:43 AM. In this study, we present the analysis on 50 selected periods; each representing 
10 minutes of captured traffic. The total amount of analyzed packet captures is 4.7 TB 
split in pcap files of 4 GB. Network activity decreases as time progresses. First file 
capture at 7:24 PM represents 21 seconds of traffic at a rate of 186,673.24 packets/sec 
and last file capture 6:13 AM represents 72 seconds of traffic at a rate of 62,112.21 
packets/sec. Time span between periods is indicated in Figure 3.1. We will refer to the 
total analyzed traffic as the Todai trace. 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented for the three main blocks of IP address 
class B discriminated in outbound and inbound connections. Unless otherwise specified, 
the term “Net” plus a number suffix, e.g. Net-1, represents a network class B and the term 
“subnet” represents a subnet class C. Numbers are used consistently to facilitate reading 
and comparison. 
Traffic characteristics were measured using different systems and tools: Bro IDS, Argus, 
capinfos, trace-summary and ad-hoc scripts. We mainly provide results obtained through 
the analysis of connection summary logs from Bro to show coherent and meaningful data 
that can be contrasted to the anomalies observed by the same system. Then, the unit of 
analysis is a connection.  
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To conduct this study, the only information we have about network usage is that Net-2 is 
the main block and together with Net-1 the address usage is high. Net-3 is an old block 
with moderate usage.  
Regarding the number of host using U-Tokyo network, we have only the IP address as a 
reference (both IDS record only IP addresses to identify hosts). DHCP and NAT servers 
make difficult to estimate the actual number. We consider, with strong likelihood, that 
during a 10 minutes period, the number of IP addresses observed in the traffic equals the 
numbers of host. In Todai trace, that quantity oscillates between 3200 and 7400 hosts 
with exceptions during bursty traffic. 
 
3.2     Limitations in the Capture Process 
 
The quality of the data is a critical factor to assure reliability of our analysis. The quality 
assessment was a difficult task since we did not participate in the capture process. 
However, we noticed two deviations that are documented in this section.  
 
3.2.1     Malformed Packets 
 
The first problem was difficult to detect. Malformed packets caused by the capture 
process introduced unpredictable results. However, the anomaly was hidden in the 
Figure 3.1 – Gap of Time Between Selected Periods. x-axis: Period, y-axis: Seconds 
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merging process of multiple small files and when was unveil it was confused with a 
traffic anomaly.  
The original capture comprise 1632 pcap files of 4 GB, each representing approximately 
20 seconds of traffic. Bro IDS does not memorize internal states for connections that 
cross file boundaries. Thus, it is recommendable to merge small files in a large pcap file 
for offline analysis. Another approach is to simulate an online analysis by feeding the 
pcap files into the Click! Modular Router [37]. Click! Router is able to load balance the 
traffic to feed a Bro cluster with many workers to leverage multiple cores and speed up 
the analysis process. 
We opted for the merging solution using the tool ipsumdump developed by the same 
author of the Click! Router. Files were merged previous to feed Bro IDS without raising 
any error or warnings. Then, while checking closely a particular attack, a worrisome 
message triggered by the network protocol analyzer (Wireshark) thwarted all attempts of 
reading the pcap file. An investigation showed that 32 files have the same pattern. 
Different tools processed the malformed packets inconsistently. Capture machine 
developer engineers are now studying the problem. 
The limitation with the capture machine forces us to analyze data in ten minutes periods. 
Experiments are conducted using 50 periods within 11 hours of captured traffic. The 
interval between periods is 3 minutes on average with the exception of gap between 
periods 32-33 and 38-39. Details are indicated in Figure 3.1. 
 
3.2.2     Noncompliance 3-way Handshake 
 
The second potential problem was revealed in other experiments conducted on the 
laboratory at the time of writing this thesis. 
The transmission in TCP Protocol is connection-oriented. Before any data can be 
transmitted, a reliable connection must be obtained and acknowledge. The process to 
establish the connection is known as the initial 3-way handshake. This initial 
communication assures that client and server synchronize each other’s sequence numbers. 
A normal 3-way handshake starts when the client sends a SYN containing the segment’s 
sequence number to the server. The server responds with a SYN-ACK to acknowledge 
the client’s sequence number and also to transmit its sequence number. The connection is 
correctly established when the client sends and ACK to the server. 
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We observe some exceptional handshakes where SYN-ACK was transmitted before the 
SYN, “early SYN-ACK”, and some SYN-ACK appear after the ACK, “delayed SYN-
ACK”; problem is illustrated in Figure 3.2. If this irregularity is an artifact introduced by 
the capture machine (or by the mirror port of the router used for the capture), it may cause 
trouble to Bro IDS, which assumes that it sees packets in the order they were in the wire. 
In that case, the outcome of our analysis would be affected. A possible explanation would 
be an out of synchronization between the uplink and the downlink wire causing 
differences in the timestamp of packets coming from different directions.  
To validate our data, we look closer at the initial handshake process initiated by more 
than 28,000 SYN and 20,000 SYN-ACK observed in 4 GB of traffic (one pcap file). An 
initial thought was to consider that fast SYN – SYN-ACK and SYN-ACK – ACK 
answers might be affected. Our metrics show the time span between the arrival of SYN 
and the associated SYN-ACK (SYN<>SYN-ACK), between the SYN-ACK and ACK 
(SYN-ACK<>ACK), and between SYN and ACK (SYN<>ACK) for three possible 
cases: normal, early SYN-ACK and delayed SYN-ACK in inbound and outbound 
connections. To simplify the problem we did not consider retransmissions to calculate 
average times, instead we used the last SYN observed and the first ACK observed. 
 
@t1 SYN 
Seq: random x 
SYN-ACK @t2 
Seq: y 
Ack: x + 1  @t3  ACK 
Seq: x+1 
Ack: y+1 
client server 
@t1 SYN 
 
 
@t2 ACK 
 
 
SYN-ACK @t3 
@t2 SYN 
 
 
@t3 ACK 
 
 
SYN-ACK @t1 
NORMAL 
DELAYED 
SYN-ACK 
EARLY 
SYN-ACK 
Figure 3.2 – Artifacts in Initial 3-way Handshake.  
Above: normal, below: delayed and early syn-ack 
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However, ambiguities in retransmissions make these calculations more complicated [38]. 
Results are presented in Table 3.1; standard deviation is between brackets.  
Normal handshake duration of connections locally initiated is obviously shorter since the 
capture machine, which is located at the U-Tokyo gateway, receives the SYN and ACK 
faster than connections externally initiated. The handshake process of early SYN-ACK 
cases, especially in connections generated locally is considerable shorter than normal 
connections. Though, the difference was generated because of our simplification of the 
problem. When checking manually the abnormal handshake situations were generated in 
cases of early SYN retransmissions and early SYN-ACK retransmissions.  
In our pcap file, a high percentage of 26% of the SYN and 8% of SYN-ACK are 
retransmissions. SYN retransmissions in benign traffic are expected to happen because at 
the moment the SYN is sent the round-trip delay has not been yet calculated and 
estimates that are too low generate SYN retransmissions [39]. 
Attacks may also explain retransmissions. In SYN flooding, an attacker generates a huge 
amount of half-open connections to exhaust server resources. The server when it first 
receives the SYN, answers immediately with a SYN-ACK. This attack is usually 
combined with IP spoofing. Thus, the ACK packet will never arrive. However, the 
unaware server will retransmit SYN-ACK a number of times to give the client a chance 
Early SYN-ACK 
#33 cases in connections initiated by Todai 
#20 cases in connections initiated remotely 
Delayed SYN-ACK 
#29 cases in connections initiated by Todai 
#9 cases in connections initiated remotely  
SYN  <>  SYN-ACK SYN  <>  ACK SYN  <>  ACK SYN-ACK  <>  ACK 
TODAI REMOTE TODAI REMOTE TODAI REMOTE TODAI REMOTE 
36039 28034 5221 215488 356800 2028927 798738 2370391 
(171233) (90057) (12044) (214601) (839634) (2113325) (1620489) (1608777) 
Normal Handshake 
# 14,046 cases in connections initiated by Todai 
#5,686 cases in connections initiated remotely 
SYN  <>  SYN-ACK SYN  <> ACK SYN-ACK  <> ACK  
TODAI REMOTE TODAI REMOTE TODAI REMOTE 
62617 19792 69296 243318 6678 223525 
(142540) (244187) (161855) (743532) (75662) (670208) 
Table 3.1 – Metrics on Initial 3-way Handshake.  
Unit: µsec – (standard deviation between brackets) 
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to resend the ACK packet. We have observed a slow amount of partial connections over 
the 20 seconds studied on this section. However, this type of attack is often seen in Todai 
trace and presented in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3     Traffic classification 
 
The feature Dynamic Detection Protocol (DPD) [31] is used for traffic classification. We 
reproduced the metrics of Table 5 published in the aforementioned paper on Table 3.2 
and Table 3.3. Unlike the original table, in this study we want to highlight the differences 
among inbound and outbound traffic, and also the number of local IP addresses involved 
in the activity. For our purposes, the merely indication of connections may give an 
erroneous impression of the magnitude of the problem. By checking local IP addresses 
we observed that thousand of connections triggering “Protocol Violations” are reduced in 
some cases to only 4 local IP addresses.    
Compared to the table published in 2006, we observe less activity of FTP, IRC or SMTP 
connections. 
Detected non-std. port Rejected by analyzer 
non-std. port 
Rejected by analyzer 
std. port 
 
# conn # local IP # conn # local IP # conn # local IP 
Net-1 
HTTP 301 31 120 2 2620 129 
FTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRC 1 1 0 0 0 0 
SMTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net-2 
HTTP 7376 29 44587 4 9096 821 
FTP 3 1 0 0 0 0 
IRC 1 1 2 2 0 0 
SMTP 0 0 0 0 17 3 
Net-3 
HTTP  67 9 0 0 1030 17 
FTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SMTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 3.2 – Detections using DPD / Inbound Connections 
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The first column shows how often a protocol detection signature flagged the given 
protocol as running on a non-standard port, for which the corresponding analyzer verified 
the detection. In the case of outbound connections we cannot discriminate which local net 
initiated them. Bro DPD logs only the server IP address, for further research connection 
logs should be checked. 
 
 
Most prominent HTTP inbound connections on non-standard ports are due to web 
application servers, peer to peer web content distribution, proxy servers, file sharing 
services and security agents. Most popular applications in Net-1 are Apache, SSH, 
Delegate, Mongrel, squid, FileMakerPro, CommuniGatePro, Trend. In Net-2, 
applications found are Apache, ligthttpd, nginx, Microsoft-IIS, Google Web Server, 
BWS, SSH, Amazon S3 and Coral CDN proxy. In Net-3, the common applications found 
are Zope, Apache, lighttpd, and squid.  
The second and third columns list how often the analyzer did not agree with the 
detection, but instead rejected the connection as exhibiting the given protocol, for non-
standard and standard ports, respectively. We have manually inspected a subset of 
protocol failures: SMTP failures are due to reply codes beyond the assigned range, IRC 
failures are mostly for extremely short messages and invalid reply number, 63% of the 
Detected and verified 
non-std. port 
Rejected by analyzer 
non-std. port 
Rejected by analyzer 
std. port 
 
# conn # local IP # conn # local IP # conn # local IP 
Net-1 
HTTP 65821 1031 144 20 12871 450 
FTP 29 23 0 0 0 0 
IRC 561 15 0 0 0 0 
SMTP 3 3 0 0 100 24 
Net-2 
HTTP 65821 1031 7293 31 10228 567 
FTP 29 23 0 0 1909 2 
IRC 561 15 2 1 64 3 
SMTP 3 3 0 0 424 33 
Net-3 
HTTP  65821 1031 13 4 431 46 
FTP 29 23 0 0 0 0 
IRC 561 15 0 0 0 0 
SMTP 3 3 0 0 21 7 
Table 3.3 – Detections using  DPD / Outbound Connections 
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total HTTP protocol violations are requests that does not follow the standard and the rest 
are replies showing the same behavior, finally FTP generates messages of non numeric 
reply code. 
 
3.4     Main Services and Applications 
 
3.4.1      Inbound and Outbound Connections  
 
According to Bro Reference Manual: 
• TCP protocol clearly defines the establishment and termination of TCP 
connections. Bro uses the variable tcp_inactivity_timeout variable for posterior 
connection classification in different states.  
• For UDP, a connection begins when host A sends a packet to host B for the first 
time, B never having sent anything to A. This transmission is termed a request, 
even if in fact the application protocol being used is not based on requests and 
replies. If B sends a packet back, then that packet is termed a reply. Each packet 
A or B sends is another request or reply. Bro UDP connection timeouts are 
specified through the udp_inactivity_timeout variable. 
• For ICMP, Bro likewise creates a connection the first time it sees an ICMP 
packet from A to B, even if B previously sent a packet to A, because that earlier 
packet would have been for a different transport connection than the ICMP itself-
--the ICMP will likely refer to that connection, but it itself is not part of the 
connection. Bro ICMP connection timeouts are specified through the 
icmp_inactivity_timeout variable. 
Graphs for each net with the distribution of incoming and outgoing connections for the 
top 15 network services (application breakdown) are presented from Figure 3.3 to Figure 
3.8. The totality of connections registered in conn.log file is used. Timeouts for 
connection definition are not modified; the default values are specified in Bro.init file. 
Traffic was captured during the less busy hours of the network; then, some activities 
gradually diminish as hour progress. Other activities remain almost constant. Bursty 
incoming traffic from particular services sometimes duplicates the amount of connections 
found in the affected period.  
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The ratio of incoming and outgoing connections for both Net-1 and Net-2 is 1:1 while in 
Net-3 the ratio is 5:1. We have processed approximately 10 million (10M), 14M and 11M 
of incoming connections for each network respectively. Another observation is the 
difference in the connection transport protocol. In Net-1, both incoming and outgoing 
connections present a roughly proportion of 65% TCP connections and 35% UDP 
connections. Net-2 is characterized with more presence of ICMP (3%) for both types of 
connections, less presence of TCP in outgoing connections (55%) but more presence in 
incoming connections (76%). Finally, Net-3 outgoing connections have a significant 
lower presence of TCP protocol (39%) that might be explained with the decrease in 
HTTP outgoing activity.  
Connection states 
States reflect the connection status at the time the Bro conn.log file is written, which is 
usually when the connection terminates or Bro terminates. The system uses 13 different 
flags to indicate: 
• S0  Connection attempt seen, no reply. 
• S1    Connection is established, not terminated. 
• SF  Normal established and termination. 
• REJ   Connection attempt rejected.  
• S2  Connection established and close attempt by originator seen. 
• S3  Connection established and close attempt by responder seen. 
• RSTO  Connection established, originator aborted (sent a RST). 
• RSTR  Established, responder aborted. 
• RSTOS0  Originator sent a SYN-ACK followed by a RST. 
• RSTRH Responder sent a SYN-ACK followed by a RST. 
• SH   Originator sent a SYN followed by a FIN. 
• SHR  Responder sent a SYN-ACK followed by a FIN. 
• OTH  No SYN seen, just midstream traffic (a “partial connection”) 
 
In Todai trace, connections are usually labeled SF or S0 but each of the analyzed 
networks is characterized with different proportions. According to the robustness 
principle of TCP protocol “be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept 
from others” outgoing connections are expected to be flagged as normal established and 
terminated. Although an important part of the connections are flagged S0, OTH or RSTO, 
a conservative rule applies to the outgoing traffic observed in U-Tokyo. Net-3 outgoing 
connections are the more conservative in the sense of that principle, with a 67.9% of 
connections flagged “SF”. Incoming connections have a lower percentage of SF 
connections, and a high percentage of connections labeled S0. 
Another significant aspect to consider is the transmitted bytes. A different application 
breakdown emerges by using this variable; results are presented in the next section.
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Figure 3.3 – Net-1: Inbound Connections 
 
Figure 3.4 – Net-1: Outbound Connections 
 
Figure 3.5 – Net-2: Inbound Connections 
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Figure 3.6 – Net-2: Outbound Connections 
 
Figure 3.7 – Net-3: Inbound Connections 
 
Figure 3.8 – Net-3. Outbound Connections 
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3.4.2     Amount of Data Exchange 
 
In order to understand the application behavior, we look at the bytes transferred by local 
and remote hosts in inbound and outbound connections registered in connection summary 
log. Our metrics discriminate between the traffic transmitted in normal established and 
terminated connections, flagged as “SF”, and the rest of connections. In TCP connections, 
transmitted bytes are calculated using the header field “Sequence Number”. It should be 
noticed that problematic connections might have erroneous values in transmitted bytes. 
Besides, in the cases that Bro did not see the end of the connection, i.e. a connection 
flagged with “S1”, there are not byte counts inside the connection summaries. Even these 
limitations, we use these measurements as a first attempt to understand the nature of the 
traffic in each network. We summarize the results from incoming and outgoing traffic 
(we considerate in each category the traffic transferred in local and remote “SF-labeled” 
connections) in Table 3.4. 
We expected to find more traffic transferred in HTTP outgoing connections; the 
difference is explained with the high traffic found in the Bro category “OTHER”. 
Protocol violations and other anomalies affect the classification.  The transmitted bytes of 
Net-3 are highly biased, showing a 99 percent of SMTP traffic. By manually checking 
some SMTP connections in Bro connection summaries, we found 255 inbound 
connections where originator is sending between 1 and 2 Gb and the responder traffic is 0 
bytes. A deeper investigation showed that the problematic connections involved three 
local IP addresses. Checking the Bro weird.log file for one of this IP disclose a wide 
variety of problematic TCP packets: SYN packets that contains data, TCP Christmas, 
RST storm, bad TCP checksum, bad TCP header length, SYN after RST, etc.  
 Net-1 Net-2 Net-3 
 In Out In Out In Out 
Amount of Traffic 
Transfer [GB] 374 82 172 159 910 548 
Main Applications [%] 
HTTP 32.3 46.7 67.3 67.2 < 1 < 1 
OTHER 8 36.3 14 12 < 1 < 1 
SMTP 52.2 6 8 10.8 99.1 93.6 
FTP 2.5 6 6.4 4 < 1 < 1 
HTTPS < 1 < 1 2.6 2.1 < 1 < 1 
SSH < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 2.3 
Table 3.4 – Amount of Traffic Transferred by Main Applications 
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To correct the erroneous statistics we filter the three local IP addresses. New metrics for 
Net-3 are showed in Table 3.5. Filtering all the connections from one host is just a basic 
step and not the best solution. The lack of previous statistics of normal traffic transfer to 
use as ground truth makes this study the first attempt to characterize Todai traffic. More 
systematic study is needed to assure that statistics obtained using Bro records are correct. 
Anomalies in the traffic generate erroneous or missing values in the count bytes field of 
the connection summary. Possible values are “?”, “0” or an excessive large number when 
the value is taken from the ACK field of a packet that announces “TCP Acked lost 
segment” (an acknowledge that Ethereal detects but cannot see the segment sent).  
The amount of data exchange in a connection is used frequently in machine learning 
based research. The field “source bytes” and “destination bytes” are part of the basic 
features of the KDD benchmark dataset and the most discriminating feature for the 
majority of the classes (normal and attack connections) [40]. This situation raises doubts 
about studies using transmitted bytes; results among researchers are difficult to compare 
or validate without an adequate treatment in pre-processing phase and a documentation of 
the process. In the case of storing huge amount of data for posterior analysis, statistics 
and normalizing procedures would also be affected. This problem may not be restricted to 
Bro, but also appear in other systems that calculate the amount of data exchange. 
 
3.5     Bogus connections 
 
Connections that cannot be classified in any well-known service are labeled “other”. In 
Net-1, this category represents 40 percent of the total incoming connections. A non-
 Net-3 
 In Out 
Amount of Traffic 
Transfer [GB] 8 38 
Main Applications [%] 
HTTP 78 47 
OTHER 6 4 
SMTP 1 10 
FTP 2 < 1 
HTTPS 2 1 
SSH 5 33 
Table 3.5 – Amount of Traffic Transferred in Net-3 with correction applied 
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negligible 37 percent of this 40 percent are connection attempts with no reply. Bursty 
traffic on period 5, 17, 36 and 40 is generated by these bogus connections. While the 
number of normal established and terminated connections (“SF” label), which represent 
42 percent of the incoming connections, steadily decrease as time passes, these bogus 
connections remains constantly with peaks of activity. A consequence of these partial 
connections is a dramatically decrease in well-established connections classified as 
“other” displayed in Figure 3.9. This phenomenon is explained by SYN-Floods [41], one 
of the most common denial-of-service attacks. Looking closer at the way SYN-floods are 
conducted over period 5 showed that duration span is approximately 2 minutes and the 
attack is repeated several times. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 – Net-1. Denial of Service Attack.  
x-axis: Periods, y-axis: Number of Connections 
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Chapter 4 
Network Anomalies 
 
4.1 Anomalies Overview 
 
Internet traffic exhibits a wide diversity of behaviors. When sensor monitors analyze data, 
unusual events are often observed. Some of these events may indicate failures in network 
components, broken protocols, bugs in applications while others may indicate malicious 
actions to confuse the monitor and evade detection. Then, it is necessary to establish 
diagnostic criteria and define how to treat these “exceptional” events.  
Bro IDS philosophy is to record all the events encounter by the analyzers because they 
can reflect erroneous assumption either by the application itself or by the users. Each 
event is associated with a customizable policy that dictates the action to take when the 
event engine generates it; see Table 4.1. While the general approach is to log all of them, 
in some cases errors occur in cascade, e.g. retransmission inconsistencies due to a TCP 
protocol bug. In those cases, the “weird_notice_once” policy filters the subsequent non-
informative events. 
For an initial deployment, the effort to understand unusual activities will provide the 
security practitioner an inside view of the network. However, from the point of view of 
usability the burden of analyzing thousands of events written in plain text files without 
knowing whether these records hold valuable information is a big concern when 
employing IDS [35]. It is common to read in the Bro mailing list that security 
practitioners ask methods to avoid recording this kind of anomalies. A solution based on 
machine learning methods is to reduce the number of alerts according two approaches 
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[42]. Fusion is the combination of alerts representing independent detection of the same 
attack. Correlation is the clustering of alerts to provide a high level view of the intrusion 
attempts.  
 
In order to apply machine learning wisely, a first stage in the research is the analysis of 
data. Even if the research project is aimed at understanding a specific aspect of security 
related topic, an overall examination is required to avoid biased results. The examination 
of anomalies in Todai trace showed that academic environments are replete with noisy 
sources that in many cases correspond to experimental systems. Measurements based on 
capture traffic generated on experimental systems may distort statistics.  
It is hard to know how frequent are the anomalous events observed by Bro in other 
environments. Compare to the reference given in the Bro wiki page, the number of 
different unusual events in one night log from University of Tokyo surpasses the 42 
distinct events seen in 10 month traces from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
In U-Tokyo environment, we found 62 types of anomalies; Appendix A includes plots for 
all of them. Each plot presents the number of records found in each of the 50 analyzed 
periods discriminated in traffic direction and IP address block. 
Policy Action 
WEIRD_UNSPECIFIED No action specified. 
 
WEIRD_IGNORE Ignore the event. 
WEIRD_FILE  Record the event to weird file, if it has not been seen for 
these hosts before. (But see weird do not ignore repeats.) 
WEIRD_NOTICE_ALWAYS Record the event to weird file and generate a notice each 
time the event occurs. 
WEIRD_NOTICE_ONCE Record the event to weird file; generate a notice the first 
time the event occurs. 
WEIRD_NOTICE_PER_CONN Record the event to weird file; generate a notice the first 
time it occurs for a given connection. 
WEIRD_NOTICE_PER_ORIG Record the event to weird file; generate a notice the first 
time it occurs for a given originating host. 
Table 4.1 – How to respond in the presence of unusual or “weird” events [30]. 
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Bro classifies anomalies according its origin: network behavior (when the event cannot be 
associated with a pair of hosts), flows (a pair of host can be identified); and connections 
(time, source IP, destination IP, source port and destination port is available).  
 
4.2     Dissecting Anomalies 
 
4.2.1     Unusual Flows 
 
This type of anomalies is triggered when the event cannot be associated with any 
connection, only with a pair of host corresponding to a flow between source address and 
destination address.  
All events deal with unusual IP fragments that in general are allowed by the standard but 
are unlikely to happen. TCP/IP suite supports the fragmentation of large packets that 
otherwise cannot be transmitted in a data link due to the link maximum transmission unit 
(MTU). To allow reassembly process, fragments include an identification field to indicate 
the original datagram (non fragmented packet), a fragmentation offset to indicate the 
position in the original datagram, and a flag to indicate the last fragment. 
Exploits to IP fragmentation are generated to bypass security measures or for denial of 
service attacks (DoS attacks). Indicators of the attempts to evade the monitor are 
“fragment inconsistency”, “excessively small fragment”, or “fragment size inconsistency” 
events. Examples of the latter case are the use of fragmentation overlap, which is the 
basic form of teardrop DoS attacks, or large IP fragments to crash some IP 
implementations. However, there is also a possibility of innocuous fragmentation events, 
sometimes fragments may overlap old fragments that were not flushed from Bro cache.  
In Todai trace, a low presence of fragmentation problems in each of the three networks is 
observed. Events observed are excessively_large_fragment, excessively_small_fragment, 
fragment_with_DF, fragment_inconsistency, fragment_size_inconsistency and 
fragment_overlap. When checking manually, we detected that some of the fragments that 
triggered inconsistencies and overlapping problems do not posses an appropriate value in 
the identification value and/or datagram offset. Reassembly of these fragments is not 
possible. The appearance of these events is associated with DoS attempts. 
DoS attack 
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An exception occurs during periods 11-14 in Net-2. From 21:23:40 PM to 22:13:06 PM, 
the number of incoming connections attempts (with no reply seen) in each period increase 
from around 90,000 to 300,000. Rejected connections also increase from to 2,000 to 
30,000. The number of normal established and terminated connections remains constant. 
A burst of probes, all coming from the same source IP address target ports: 80, 1080, 
3124, 3127, 3128, 6588, 8080, 50050. Port 3127 is a favorite backdoor created by 
myDoom variants and more recently Agobot family. During the attack, an outstanding 
quantity of “fragment_inconsistency” events is observed in the weird.log file. In 
period12, only one remote IP address and one local IP address are involved in 1844 
events represents 70% of the total highly unusual fragmentation inconsistencies observed.  
Using Bro, this attack can be observed by the analysis of conn.log and weird.log files. 
The lack of hints to recognize this attack inside the alarm.log file points out the 
importance of analyzing anomalous events that do not necessary trigger alarms.  
DoS attack is confirmed by the Frag3 preprocessor (ssp_frag3) of Snort. Alarms triggered 
on period 12 are: Fragmentation overlap (# 2168), Teardrop attack (#5) and Tiny 
fragment (#1). Teadrop attack exploits IP fragmentation using crafted fragments with 
false information on the offset field to cause the system to be unstable during packet 
reassembly. During the attack the number of normal established connections does not 
decrease, indicating that recent systems are no longer vulnerable to this attack. Results 
are limited by the offline analysis; in online analysis a flood of fragments may saturate 
IDS resources to make a successful attack.  
Overlapping Fragments 
It should be noticed that in period 12, Bro raised a total of 2615 fragmentation 
inconsistencies; the gap between Bro fragmentation_inconsistency events number and 
Snort ssp_frag3 alarms number is probably due to configurations on both systems.  
IDSs do not necessary observed the same traffic that endpoints see. Attackers may 
manipulate its own traffic to exploit flaws existing in several stages of the packet 
evaluation and reassembly processes. Description of denial of service, insertion attacks 
(when monitor analyze packets that will never reached the destination) and evasion 
attacks (when monitor fail to observe some packets) are given in [43]. This problem 
affects IP fragmentation as well as TCP segmentation reassembly processes. When 
retransmission and data overlapping occur, some systems favor old data while others 
favor new data.   
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Shankar and Paxson draw attention to five methods for fragmentation reassembly 
performed by different operating system [44]. Snort engineers focus on TCP 
fragmentation conflicts and reveal more possible policies in [45] making them available 
for users to customize preprocessors in the configuration file. Snort incorporates the use 
of a Host Attribute Table to specify a policy per each host of the local network and a 
general policy for hosts not listed on the table. Such table is design for improving the 
output of Snort frag3 and stream5 preprocessors, which are target-based system; output 
depends on the directives passed to the system. In a large network environment, where 
NAT servers hide inner hosts and DHCP protocol frequently reassigns IP addresses, the 
Host Attribute Table is an unmanageable solution and other strategies are needed.  
For this research, the Snort default reassembly policy is set to Windows meaning that 
Snort will reassembly packet as its destination is a Windows host. Windows favor old 
segments, except when the subsequent segment begins before the original segment. 
Bro does not support policy configuration. In the case of online analysis an active 
mapping for fingerprinting host operating systems was available but it is no longer 
supported. For the case of TCP segmentation overlapping, only the segments identified as 
malicious trigger rexmit_inconsistency events in the notice.log file. These events are 
associated with connections and are not part of this analysis. 
 
4.2.2     Unusual Connections 
 
This category corresponds to anomalous events that can be identified by the tuple <time 
when the event is seen, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port>. Included 
events are handled by Bro conn_weird, conn_weird_add1 and other events generated by 
selected analyzers. Table 4.2 list all the unusual events observed in Todai trace. Some of 
them refer to problematic packets, others to general characteristics of the connection and 
other to application specifics.  
It is observed that the likelihood of these events depends on the direction of the 
connection, the observed time and the network. Besides, some anomalies are presented in 
bursts, others appear steadily during the whole period and others decrease frequency as 
time progresses. Sometimes, the appearance of one or two anomalies is a clue to predict 
the arrival of others events. Previous work showed correlations among anomalies [46]. 
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There are various reasons that can explain why anomalies occurred. To simplify the 
complex analysis of more than ten terabytes, a principle from the economist Vilfredo 
Pareto is imported to the information security field. Pareto Principle, “80-20 rule”, states 
that roughly 80 percent of the effects come from 20 percent of the causes. In computer 
science, this principle applies to some aspects of software engineering and recently a 
study to predict attack-prone components in a system was published [47].  
above_hole_data_without_any_acks 
data_before_established 
excessive_data_without_further_acks 
FIN_advanced_last_seq 
FIN_storm 
inappropriate_FIN 
possible_split_routing 
connection_originator_SYN_ack 
SYN_seq_jump 
SYN_after_reset 
bad_SYN_ack 
SYN_inside_connection 
SYN_after_close 
SYN_after_partial 
SYN_with_data 
repeated_SYN_with_ack 
RST_storm 
TCP_christmas 
baroque_SYN 
corrupt_tcp_options 
bad_TCP_header_len 
window_recision 
bad_UDP_checksum 
bad_ICMP_checksum 
bad_TCP_checksum 
premature_connection_reuse 
data_after_reset 
active_connection_reuse 
simultaneous_open 
partial_ftp_request 
malformed_ssh_identification 
partial_RPC_request 
unpaired_RPC_response 
inflate_failed 
NUL_in_line 
HTTP_chunked_transfer_for_multipart_message 
HTTP_version_mismatch 
base64_illegal_encoding 
illegal_%_at_end_of_URI 
unescaped_%_in_URI 
unescaped_special_URI_char 
double_%_in_URI 
unmatched_HTTP_reply 
unexpected_multiple_HTTP_requests 
line_terminated_with_single_CR 
HTTP_bad_chunk_size 
can’t be parse 
multiple_login_prompts 
no_login_prompt 
irc_line_too_short 
irc_invalid_command 
irc_invalid_topic_reply 
irc_invalid_line 
irc_invalid_reply_number 
irc_invalid_who_line 
irc_line_size_exceeded 
Table 4.2 – List of unusual events associated with connections 
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Activity in the academic network includes controlled experiments that can be source of 
hundreds, or sometimes thousands of anomalies over a short period of time. In some 
cases, the experimental hosts transport benign anomalous traffic that may not raise attack 
alarms but posses unusual traffic characteristics. In other cases, the inherent 
characteristics of the research project, e.g. honeynets or anonymous proxy servers, make 
the system vulnerable and up to 100% of traffic could be considered malicious. These 
noisy systems explain a large number of anomalies observed in Todai traffic. While the 
80-20 rule is not strictly followed, a large percentage of anomalies can be associated with 
a small number of hosts.  
The inclusion of disruptive sources in datasets aimed at anomaly detection research 
should be studied carefully since they can undermine statistics and affect the visibility of 
network traffic diversity.  
When observing anomalous events over a long time period, in our experiments several 
hours, the recognition of noisy sources is easier than in online analysis. Then, a good 
practice for conducting online analysis is a prior offline assessment of network 
characteristics.  
In this section, examples to illustrate anomalous behaviors in U-Tokyo Network are 
presented for packets, TCP connections and applications. IP addresses that generate an 
annoying quantity of events are identified as sources of noise. The anomalies selected 
represent more than one third of the total anomalous events triggered by Bro. Snort alerts 
are used for better understanding when is possible. Each anomaly is summarized in a 
table, indicating the amount of events, a ranking2 number (RK) indicating how frequent 
the event is, and the amount of events that can be reduce to few sources of noise.  
 
Packet Anomalies 
bad_ICMP_checksum 
Description This event indicates that the checksum field in ICMP packet was invalid. 
Observed # 7,259 (RK 14) 
Origin 65% targets 53 net-1 IP addresses 
 80% of this 65% Involve 1 local IP 
 30% targets 53 net-2 IP addresses 
 76% of this 30% Involve 2 local IP 
Table 4.3 – Statistical summary for bad_ICMP_checksum 
                                                
2 RK 1 means most frequent event 
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Top rank affected hosts are analyzed. Less than 5 hosts in each local net are the major 
destination of the ICMP packets. The two most affected IP address of net-2 correspond to 
two machines that are used for Planetlab [48], a testbed system open to public. There is 
no information about the uses of hosts from net-1.  
Encrypted connections and connections classified as “other” over tcp and udp protocols 
are found. In both nets the ICMP packets are answers to outbound connections attempts 
over UDP to unreachable remote ports. Bit Torrent may have generated this pattern in 
traffic. 
Data transmitted inside the verified ICMP packets correspond to the encapsulated UDP 
packet that generated the ICMP message.  No particular problems are observed. 
Snort Preprocessor Stream5 does not contribute with more anomalies. 
It should be notice that the possibility of carrying data in ICMP packets may be exploit 
by attackers to carry data surreptitiously. Especially the ICMP echo-request/echo-reply 
are use to create convert channels. In some situations, the simplicity of ICMP packets is 
seen as an advantage. The lack of port numbers may be used to bypass firewalls or other 
security measures. Botnets use ICMP tunneling to establish communications with the 
compromised machines. Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) targeting Amazon, 
Yahoo and other large companies have been organized through ICMP tunnels [49].  
IDS systems are challenged to differentiate between legal and illegal ICMP packets. 
Recognized encrypted and non-encrypted payload is also an open problem. 
bad_TCP_checksum 
Description 
Invalid TCP checksums might be used in subtle attacks where an attacker is 
aware of the presence of a monitor between them and the victim machine 
and tries to convey their activity undetected 
Observed # 151,413 (RK 3) 
Origin 67% initiated by 203 net-2 IP addresses 
 74% of this 67% involve 10 local IP 
 97% of this 67% target port 20480 
 30% initiated by 135 net-1 IP addresses 
 80% of this 30% involve 7 local IP 
 95% of this 30% target port 20480 
Table 4.4 – Statistical summary for bad_TCP_checksum 
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Top rank affected hosts are analyzed. Unclassified connections attempts to port 20480 are 
seen over the 50 periods. IP destination address belongs to Google, Akamai, NTT, 
TrendMicro, Yahoo, Microsoft among other large well-known companies and host are 
mainly located in U.S.A., Japan and China. Port 20480 is a register port for the emwave 
Message Service but connections observed in Todai traffic do not seem carry this 
protocol. Bro identifies this traffic with “OTH” status, which means “no SYN seen, only 
midstream traffic”.  
The examination of some packets using Wireshark brought out that flags “RST” and 
“ACK” are set and checksum is incorrect. 
Possible reasons for initiating connections towards port 20480 are: 
- Multiplayer Game Services 
- Malformed packet towards port 80. Computers interpret numbers differently 
according the endianness of the processor architecture. Endiannes indicates the 
order to read individual subunits within a longer data word. Little endian 
machines will read port 80 as “50” in hex and “01010000” in binary. It also reads 
port 20480 as “5000” in hex and “0101000000000000” in binary. 
Bugs in multiplatform applications may mislead port 80 to port 20480. We have seen 
some services running on DirectServer/8.0.7.i6 iPSX (Solaris; Ultra/Sparc), which is a 
big endian architecture. Some Sparc processors can access data in both endian orders, the 
option is at the application instruction level or at the memory page level.  
 
TCP Connection Anomalies 
 
above_hole_data_without_any_acks 
Description 
Could mean packet drop; could also be a faulty TCP implementation. This 
anomaly is worth to evaluate in online analysis, to detect packet dropping. 
Observed # 156,227 (RK 2) 
Origin 74% targets 232 net-1 IP addresses 
 68% of this 74% involve 2 local IP 
 99% of this 74% target 1 subnet C 
Table 4.5 – Statistical summary for above_hole_data_without_any_acks 
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The plot in Appendix A shows a high number of events at the beginning of the capture. It 
indicates that BRO was not able to see the ACK packets. When data exceeds the 
“max_above_hole_without_any_acks” threshold, an event is triggered and buffer is 
released. The increasing trend around periods 33-40 is due to a longer interval of time 
between analyzed periods. The gap between periods 32-33 is nearly 15 minutes and 
between periods 38-39 is about 19 minutes. 
Top rank affected hosts are analyzed. The amount of incoming events for net-1 is 
significantly high. 73% of total events (99% of the incoming events to net-1) are mostly 
related to connections attempts from a laboratory in the U.S.A. to one local subnet class 
C, particularly to one host (68% of activity). That host is associated with a research 
project. However, connections status are mostly labeled as irregular: S0, SH and SHR.  
Bro triggered 246 alarms of port scanning activity from the same laboratory. 
 
Application Anomalies 
HTTP_version_mismatch 
Description A persistent HTTP connection sent a different version number for a 
subsequent item than it did initially. 
Observed # 25,030 (RK 12) 
Origin 45% initiated by 355 net-2 IP address 
 72% of this 45% Involve 2 local IP 
 96% of this 45% Targets 2 port 
Table 4.6 – Statistical summary for HTTP_version_mismatch 
 
72% of the total events are generated by two host from Planetlab that run an experimental 
http proxy service. In a 10 min of traffic capture, we found that 60% corresponds to “Bad 
Request”. The activity of this server also generates other anomalies: 
63% unexpected_multiple_HTTP_requests, 46% line_terminated_with_single_CR,  
21% bad_ICMP_checksum, 19% unescaped_special_URI_char,  
8% unmatched_HTTP_reply 
 
4.3     Final Observations 
 
The previous sections have served to explore in detail the most characteristic feature of 
the anomalies found using Bro. This research would not be complete without considering 
the events detected by Snort. 
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We applied Snort in 20% of the data analyzed with Bro. The outcome included an 
outstanding number of events related with fragmentation and overlapping (more than 
90% of the events trigger are fragmentation). These anomalies combined with events of 
bad checksum in TCP packets (observed with Bro) can be connected with cases of 
evasion. However, limitations on the tools or in our analysis may generate a large amount 
of false alarms. Bro also identified an important amount of this type of events, but the 
fragmentation problem and the other events are more evenly distributed. A possible 
explanation could be the way the two systems process the data and the policies for 
fragmented packet reassembly. We think a study focused only on the fragmented packets 
would illuminate on this problem. Machine learning could help, e.g., packet header 
values can be used for clustering fragmented packets. 
If these events are associated with evasion techniques used by botnets, a look at the 
output of SMTP and DNS Bro analyzers will also help in understanding this matter.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this thesis, we presented the analysis of anomalies in the Internet traffic observed at the 
U-Tokyo campus network gateway. This chapter summarizes the outcome of our study 
and proposes ideas for future research. 
 
5.1     Summary 
 
IDS based on machine learning algorithms have low acceptance in the operational real-
world network environment [2]. One of the causes is the use of data that failed to 
represent the actual behavior of Internet for training and validation of new models. In 
particular, a considerable part of the bibliography found on anomalous research is based 
on the outdated KDD dataset benchmark, which was generated in a simulated network 
environment. Our thesis is that the most important part of pre-processing is auditing (1) 
real, (2) up-to-date and (3) large amount of data before selecting reliable features for IDS. 
When using an already prepared dataset, researchers do not have the opportunity to face 
the limitations that appear when real data is analyzed. Besides, in the case of KDD data, 
studies are limited to 41 features that describe the traffic generated by user connections 
with the assumption that they can describe real, actual Internet traffic. New Internet 
traffic characteristics are not considered.  
For this thesis research, we analyze 6.5 TB tcpdump binary data that represents 12 hours 
traffic of a large academic network environment. Academic network traffic has unique 
characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct a 
47 
baseline of network traffic behavior that highlights a series of problems encountered in 
the analysis of a large amount of captured packets. 
Our work made the following main contributions:  
 We conducted an analysis that covers a wide aspect of anomalous behavior. This 
thesis presents diverse pathologies found at different levels of the network stack 
covering a wide variety of cases ranging from fragmentation to bad packet checksums 
to TCP anomalies and to application anomalies that represent 40% of the total 
anomalous events triggered by Bro IDS. Using the KDD dataset as a reference, we 
identified 5 behaviors that are missing from KDD dataset and could be defined as new 
features or can be used to rule out data that may distort statistics and consequently 
reduce the detection power of machine learning algorithms. These characteristics are: 
bugs in applications, detection of experimental systems (typical presence in academic 
networks), server found running on non-standard ports, protocol violations and 
indicators that may alert about evasion techniques.  
 We detected DoS attacks. Two different types of DoS attacks are documented. The 
first case is generated by SYN flooding and the technique demonstrates to be effective 
in that scenario. The second case is generated by packets fragmentation. The latter 
may become a threat to exhaust IDS resources. 
 We documented problems in research that may lead to wrong results due to 
misinterpretations of data or misconfigurations in software (IDS configuration “by 
default”). Participants with diverse backgrounds do research on network anomalies. 
Thus, our approach is trying to understand better the nature of common anomalies 
found in current operational networks to benefit researchers coming from network, 
information security and machine learning areas.  
 We assessed the quality of data by analyzing the potential and the real problems in the 
capture process. The evaluation also beneficiates the other experiments run in our 
department. The capture machine manufacturer has been informed about our findings. 
Bugs are subject to deep investigation. 
 We described the application breakdown in terms of connections and the amount of 
traffic transfers. Both approaches show different aspects of the network behavior and 
contribute to a better understanding of the service and applications found.  
 
5.2     Future Work 
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During this research, we have identified several opportunities for extending our work:  
 
Fine-grained analysis 
 A coarse-grained analysis is necessary to detect a wide variety of anomalous events 
and generates a baseline to show the interesting and curious patterns that describe U-
Tokyo network behavior. However, a fine-grained approach is needed to focus on 
threats such as botnets and distributed attacks. Currently, data is also used for research 
on spamming and video streaming. 
 We analyze 10% of the anomalies triggered by BRO that represents 34% of the total 
events. In Appendix A, plots for the totality of triggered events show how frequent 
anomalies are found.  Exhaustive analysis of the causes is also interesting. 
 
Comparisons 
 Lax security measures and experiments may cause academic networks to show to 
some extent a different behavior than company networks. We need to have a baseline 
for commercial networks to measure how we depart from security problems observed 
on business environments by using data capture in the academic network.  
 We constructed a baseline based on U-Tokyo network behavior over the night of a 
weekday in July 2009. Network behaves differently according the hour of the day, the 
day of the week and the month of the year. To find invariants in the network behavior, 
it is necessary to examine the same network using up-to-date data. For understanding 
state-of-the-art attack techniques and the evolution of evasion methods to bypass 
security controls, we also need to compare and contrast the outcome of this thesis with 
the analysis of a new capture. 
 Preprocessors in Snort IDS identify some network anomalies. To conduct our 
research, we run Snort to improve our understanding on some particular problems 
covering only 20 percent of the captured data.  
 
Machine Learning 
 To achieve our goal, there is a huge amount of manual processes that should not be 
underestimated. Each environment has the unique characteristics and researchers need 
to learn them before using data for metrics. Then we need a framework to facilitate 
these operations. Simply clustering sources causing noise for each anomaly may ease 
our efforts. Features for clustering may be the IP destination, the source port and the 
time gap between events among other variables ranging from one anomaly to another.  
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 An open topic for research on machine learning is finding connections between traffic 
analysis and anomalies, for example, determining the network conditions that precede 
the occurrence of anomalies. 
 To detect evasion techniques, we need to study in more detail header fields of the 
packets involved in these anomalies. For example, inconsistent values of TTL may 
indicate attacks.  
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Appendix  
A     Frequency of anomalous events 
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1. unmatched_HTTP_reply 
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2. above_hole_data_without_any_acks 
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3. bad_TCP_checksum 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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4. unescaped_special_URI_char 
5. can't  parse 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
   
6. line_terminated_with_single_CR 
I 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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7. unescaped_%_in_URI 
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8. window_recision 
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9. inflate_failed 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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10. data_before_established 
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11. connection_originator_SYN_ack 
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12. HTTP_version_mismatch 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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13. data_after_reset 
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14. bad_ICMP_checksum 
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15. bad_UDP_checksum 
I 
   
O
 
   
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
60
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
200
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
2
4
6
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
100
200
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
200
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
2
4
6
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1000
2000
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
 Appendix - 7 
16. SYN_with_data 
I 
   
O
 No events No events No events 
17. unexpected_multiple_HTTP_requests 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
 
No events No events 
18. possible_split_routing 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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19. SYN_seq_jump 
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20. irc_line_too_short 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
  
No events 
21. fragment_inconsistency 
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No events No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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22. base64_illegal_encoding 
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23. NUL_in_line 
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24. active_connection_reuse 
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No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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25. HTTP_chunked_transfer_for_multipart_message 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
   
26. inappropriate_FIN 
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27. SYN_after_reset 
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x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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28. fragment_overlap 
I 
   
O
 No events 
 
No events 
29. FIN_advanced_last_seq 
I 
   
O
 
   
30. SYN_inside_connection 
I 
   
O
 
   
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
150
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
15
20
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
3
4
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
 Appendix - 12 
31. multiple_login_prompts 
I 
  
No events 
O
 No events 
  
32. premature_connection_reuse 
I 
   
O
 
   
33. double_%_in_URI 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
  
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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34. excessive_data_without_further_acks 
I No events 
  
O
 
  
No events 
35. fragment_with_DF 
I 
   
O
 No events 
 
No events 
36. SYN_after_partial 
I 
   
O
 No events No events No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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37. malformed_ssh_identification 
I 
  
No events 
O
 No events 
 
No events 
38. TCP_christmas 
I 
   
O
 
   
39. corrupt_tcp_options 
I 
   
O
 No events No events No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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40. FIN_storm 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
   
41. bad_SYN_ack 
I 
   
O
 
   
42. illegal_%_at_end_of_URI 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
   
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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43. irc_invalid_line 
I 
 
No events No events 
O
 
  
No events 
44. RST_storm 
I 
   
O
 
   
45. SYN_after_close 
I 
   
O
 
   
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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46. fragment_size_inconsistency 
I 
   
O
 
 
No events No events 
47. excessively_small_fragment 
I 
   
O
 
  
No events 
48. simultaneous_open 
I 
  
No events 
O
 
  
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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49. bad_TCP_header_len 
I 
   
O
 No events 
 
No events 
50. irc_invalid_command 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
  
No events 
51. excessively_large_fragment 
I No events 
  
O
 No events 
 
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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52. HTTP_bad_chunk_size 
I No events 
  
O
 
 
No events No events 
53. unpaired_RPC_response 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
 
No events No events 
54. irc_invalid_topic_reply 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
  
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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55. baroque_SYN 
I 
   
O
 No events No events No events 
56. no_login_prompt 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
   
57. irc_invalid_reply_number 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
  
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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58. partial_RPC_request 
I No events 
 
No events 
O
 
 
No events No events 
59. repeated_SYN_with_ACK 
I 
 
No events No events 
O
 No events No events No events 
60. partial_ftp_request 
I No events No events No events 
O
 No events 
 
No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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61. irc_line_size_exceeded 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
 
No events No events 
62. irc_invalid_who_line 
I No events No events No events 
O
 
 
No events No events 
x-axis: 50 periods, y-axis: Number of anomalies found on that period. Left: NET-1, center: NET-2, right: NET-3 
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Appendix 
B    Reference for the analyzed periods  
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Analyzed Periods 
Id From To 
15th June 2009 
1 19:24:49 19:34:48 
2 19:35:47 19:45:46 
3 19:46:44 19:56:43 
4 19:57:48 20:07:47 
5 20:09:00 20:19:59 
6 20:20:43 20:30:42 
7 20:32:39 20:42:38 
8 20:45:00 20:55:59 
9 20:56:41 21:06:40 
10 21:09:51 21:19:50 
11 21:23:40 21:33:39 
12 21:36:57 21:46:56 
13 21:50:51 22:00:50 
14 22:03:07 22:13:06 
15 22:15:56 22:25:55 
16 22:29:33 22:39:32 
17 22:42:33 22:52:32 
18 22:54:56 23:04:55 
19 23:07:19 23:17:18 
20 23:20:21 23:30:20 
21 23:34:41 23:44:40 
22 23:50:51 0:00:50 
16th June 2009 
23 0:09:43 0:19:42 
24 0:19:43 0:29:42 
25 0:30:08 0:40:07 
26 0:40:08 0:50:07 
27 0:50:25 1:00:24 
28 1:06:46 1:16:45 
29 1:21:07 1:31:06 
30 1:37:27 1:47:26 
31 1:52:20 2:02:19 
32 2:07:04 2:17:03 
33 2:32:01 2:42:00 
34 2:42:01 2:52:00 
35 2:52:01 3:02:00 
36 3:04:58 3:14:57 
37 3:20:12 3:30:11 
38 3:31:00 3:40:59 
39 4:01:50 4:11:49 
40 4:16:11 4:26:10 
41 4:26:43 4:36:42 
42 4:37:35 4:47:34 
43 4:48:52 4:58:51 
44 5:00:18 5:10:17 
 Appendix - 25 
Id From To 
16th June 2009 
45 5:11:40 5:21:39 
46 5:23:31 5:33:30 
47 5:40:12 5:50:11 
48 5:50:12 6:00:11 
49 6:00:12 6:10:11 
50 6:13:01 6:23:00 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
